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HAS THE CITIZEN-SUIT PROVISION OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT EXCEEDED ITS SUPPLEMENTAL BIRTH?
JONATHAN S. CAMPBELL*
The bar on citizen suits when governmental enforcement
action is under way suggests that the citizen suit is meant to
supplement rather than supplant governmental action ....
"[T]he Committee intends the great volume of enforcement
actions [to] be brought by the State," and that citizen suits
are proper only "if the Federal, State, and local agencies
fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress enacted the Clean Water Act2 ("CWA" or "the
Act") in 1972, it intended "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."3 Passed in response to
America's increased pollution of its waterways and water supplies, the
Clean Water Act prohibits discharging any pollutants except as otherwise
allowed in the Act.4  The National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") is one such exception. Under the NPDES the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is charged with the duty of
issuing NPDES permits, which allow pollutant discharge within specified
limits.5  When a discharger fails to comply with its permit, the Act
* Mr. Campbell received his B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1997 and his J.D.
from the William and Mary School of Law in the spring of 2000. Beginning in the fall of
2000, Mr. Campbell will clerk for the Honorable James C. Turk in the Western District of
Virginia.
' Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987),
quoted in S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973).
2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896 (1972) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
3 Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
4 See id. § 1311 (a).
5 See id. § 1342(a). EPA may delegate this permit-issuing authority to states with
approved programs. See id. § 1342(b). In fact, most states have been delegated such
authority and are therefore the primary enforcers of discharge limitations.
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authorizes the EPA to enforce the permit through civil, criminal, or
administrative means.6
In addition to enforcement by the EPA or another administrative
agency, section 505 of the CWA delineates in detail the manner in which a
citizen can initiate a citizen-suit against anyone "who is alleged to be in
violation of... an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter.",7
Under the Clean Water Act, individual citizens8 or groups have
statutory standing to bring an action against an alleged violator. 9 The
citizen must give notice to the state government in which the violation
occurs before the citizen may file the suit.' 0 After the state has notice for
at least sixty days, the citizen may commence the action." The citizen
suit provision of the Clean Water Act serves to supplement both state and
federal government enforcement actions.' 2
Problems arise when a citizen group gives notice, properly files an
action, and the state government then decides to begin its own
enforcement action. Many times the government enforcement will
conclude with the violator and the state agency entering into a consent
decree. 13  Pursuant to the consent decree, the violator will generally
endure penalties, payable to the United States Treasury, and cease all
present and future illegal conduct. Although the violator will pay such
penalties, the citizen plaintiff may want to continue the citizen suit due to
the consent decree's allegedly minimal sanctions. To avoid duplicative
litigation, however, the defendant will argue that the citizen suit should be
moot or precluded as a matter of law, thus dismissing the action. The
citizen plaintiff often believes that the consent decree did not fulfill the
6 See id. § 1319. In order to be delegated NPDES issuance authority, states must have in
place mechanisms "[t]o abate violations of the permit or the permit program, including
civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means of enforcement . . . ." Id. §
1342(b)(7).
7 Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994).
8 The Act defines a citizen as a "person or persons having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected." Id. § 1365(g).
9 See id. § 1365.
'oSee id. § 1365(b).
iSee id. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
12 See S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER QUALITY ACT OF 1987, at 1149 (1988) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
13 A consent decree may be defined as a "judgement entered by consent of the parties
whereby the defendant agrees to stop alleged illegal activity without admitting guilt or
wrongdoing. [It is an] agreement by defendant to cease activities asserted as illegal by
[the] government." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 410-11 (6th ed. 1990).
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intention of the Clean Water Act, and that the defendant deserves harsher
penalties. Courts confront such situations with increasing frequency and
decide the fate of the citizen-suit in varying manners.
A citizen's power to file suit has prescribed limitations. 4
Congress amended section 1319(g)(6), which precludes the filing of a
citizen suit under certain circumstances as follows:
[A]ny violation-
(i) with respect to which the Administrator or the
Secretary has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an action under this subsection,
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting an action under a State law
comparable to this subsection, or
(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or the
State has issued a final order not subject to further
judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty
assessed under this subsection, or such comparable
State law, as the case may be,
shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under...
section 1365 of this title.'
5
Although this section limits a citizen's ability to file a suit, subparagraph
(B) of the same section formulates two exceptions to the citizen-suit's
preclusion under the Act. 6  Specifically, 17 the citizen-suit will not be
precluded if 1) the action under section 1365(a)(1) is filed after the
commencement of the citizen suit, or 2) before action has commenced
under section 1365(a)(1), the citizen has given notice of an intent to bring
action and the citizen files suit within 120 days after giving such notice.19
14 See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994).
'S Id. § 1319(g)(6)(A).
16 See id. § 1319(g)(6)(B).
17 Although the language of the Act does not preclude the filing of and continuation of a
valid citizen-suit, the legal tools of mootness and preclusion may warrant a dismissal.
The Clean Water Act specifically provides that common law rights and statutory rights
are not restricted. "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ...
may have under any statute or common law." Id. § 1365(0. This Note will address
instances where a citizen-suit may proceed under the language of the Act, but where
common law legal principles should intervene and fird the citizen-suit moot for lack of
redressability or precluded because of a prior valid consent decree.
' See Id. § 1319(g)(6)(B)(i).
'9 See id. § 1319(g)(6)(B)(ii). To avoid preclusion, a citizen plaintiff must give potential
governmental agencies sixty days to file suit against the polluter. See id. § 1365(a)(1).
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The lack of clarity in this section poses many problems of interpretation
for courts. Although some courts take a strict preclusion approach to
citizen-suits, others liberally apply the preclusion section of the Act and
often allow duplicative citizen-suits.2 °  In light of such varied
interpretations, future courts may find it difficult to address the effect of
state negotiated consent decrees commenced after a valid citizen-suit is
filed in federal court.
This Note analyzes the specific circumstances in which a citizen
plaintiff files a state and federal claim against an alleged violator under the
Clean Water Act, and a state agency subsequently enters into a consent
decree with the polluter in state court. Specifically, the hypothetical of
this Note presupposes that the consent decree imposes substantial
penalties and forces the defendant to stop all present and future pollution.
The thrust of this analysis focuses on whether the state consent decree
precludes or moots the continuance of the federal citizen suit in federal
court. Section I provides an overview of various cases discussing
arguments both for and against mooting or precluding the federal claim
after a valid state consent decree. Section II addresses the application of
the mootness doctrine and the application of res judicata in the context of
a state consent decree. This section provides a comparison of various
cases regarding the preclusive effect of consent decrees and the standards
by which to judge the citizen-suits. Section III provides a context for
which courts may still award litigation costs2 1 to the citizen-suit plaintiff,
even if the court found the citizen-suit moot for lack of standing or
precluded by resjudicata. Finally, section IV concludes that the Supreme
The citizen plaintiff must then file the citizen suit before the 120th day after the date upon
which such notice to the agencies was given. See id. § 1319 (g)(6)(B)(ii).20 A court's interpretation of the preclusion section often hinges on its determination of
comparable state law and what constitutes a penalty under the Act warranting preclusion.
For a general discussion of the courts' interpretation of section 309 and preclusion of
citizen-suits, see Heather L. Clauson, How Far Should the Bar on Citizen Suits Extend
Under § 309 of the Clean Water Act?, 27 ENVTL. L. 967 (1997) and Elizabeth McKinney,
Preclusion of Citizens' Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 357 (1995). In contrast to the Clauson and McKinney articles though, this
Note discusses the specific instance when a citizen validly files a citizen suit under the
Act and a state agency subsequently enters into a consent decree with the alleged
polluter. Under most circumstances, this Note argues, the citizen suit should be moot or
precluded as a matter of law. Furthermore, this Note advocates a totality of
circumstances approach rather than a bright line rule approach to determine when the
courts should find the citizen suit moot or precluded.
21 The Clean Water Act affords "any prevailing or substantially prevailing party"
litigation costs, "including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees." Federal Water
Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994).
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Court should address the role of a valid state consent decree in mooting or
precluding a citizen-suit in federal court in order to clear the murky waters
polluting the lower courts.
II. PROBLEMS FACED BY COURTS REGARDING PRINCIPLES OF MOOTNESS
AND PRECLUSION UNDER THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT
The Clean Water Act specifically fails to address a consent
decree's effect on a citizen-suit.22 An interpretative analysis of the Act
could equate a consent decree with an "action" under section 1319.23 This
interpretation would then allow the continuance of a citizen-suit if the
government enters into the decree after the citizen files suit. The statute's
plain language, however, does not expressly dictate that courts should
interpret a consent decree as an "action. '24 Precedent also fails to provide
future courts with clear guidelines to apply the preclusion or mootness
principle of law when a citizen-suit is filed and followed by a state
agency's valid consent decree with the same polluter. The lack of a clear
Supreme Court decision 25 has led to varied holdings in federal courts
22 See id. § 1365.
23 See id. § 1319(g)(6)(B). Under the language of the Act, a citizen-suit will not be
precluded when:
(i) a civil action under section 1365(a)(1) of this, title has been filled
prior to commencement of an action under this subsection, or
(ii) notice of an alleged violation of section 1365(a)(1) of this title has
been given in accordance with section 1365(b)(1)(A) of this title
prior to commencement of an action under this subsection and an
action under section 1365(a)(1) of this title with respect to such
alleged violation is filed before the 120th day after the date on
which such notice is given.
Id. (emphasis added).
24 Courts find the term "action" difficult to interpret. Without clear statutory language,
the challenge of deciphering the meaning of a provision confronts courts. See ABNER J.
MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 22 (1997). The legislative intent of the Clean Water Act serves as
guidance for an interpretation of such ambiguous language. The Supreme Court
acknowledged the importance of legislative intent as well, explaining that "[w]hen aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly
can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
'superficial examination."' Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426
U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,
543-44 (1940)).
25 Although the Court specifically addressed the role of citizen-suits, under the Clean
Water Act as a supplemental tool rather than a device to supplant the government's role,
the holding fails to provide clear guidelines for lower courts. See generally Gwaltney of
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regarding the continuation of citizen-suits under this specific
circumstance. Although some courts have dismissed citizen-suits after a
governmental agency intervenes and creates a consent decree,26 others
have allowed the redundancy of the citizen-suit to continue. 27 The 1987
amendments to the Clean Water Act, which permit the filing of citizen
suits, sought to "balance two opposing concerns: allowing citizen-suits to
continue as a proven enforcement tool while preventing violators from
being subject to dual enforcement actions or penalties for the same
violation."28  Unfortunately, due to the lack of clear Supreme Court
precedent, the second concern has swallowed the first and ultimately
undermined the incentive for polluters to enter into consent decrees and
cease violations.
A. Mootness Doctrine
1. Precedent Supporting Dismissal of the Citizen-Suit
In Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak Company 29
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found a citizen-
suit moot after a consent decree between the state government and the
polluter.30 The citizen plaintiff followed the guidelines of the Clean Water
Act and filed a valid citizen-suit against Eastman Kodak.31 Atlantic States
Foundation alleged that Eastman Kodak violated the NPDES permit by
discharging pollutants into a nearby river.32 After the commencement of
the citizen action, the New York Department of Conservation ("DEC")
entered into a consent decree with Kodak, which required the polluter to
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). More importantly,
this Note suggests that the Supreme Court should address instances that fall outside the
scope of the Clean Water Act, but the policies and intent behind the role of citizen-suits
should find the citizen action precluded or moot.
26 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998); Atlantic States
Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991).
27 See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017
(2d Cir. 1993); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207 (4th
Cir. 1985); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc v. Elf Atochem N. Am.,
Inc., 817 F. Supp 1164 (D.N.J. 1993).
28 Clauson, supra note 20, at 969 (1997).
29933 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991).
30 See id. at 128.
31 See id. at 125-26.
32 See id.
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admit liability and pay a fine totaling one million dollars. 33 The citizen
plaintiff, Atlantic States Foundation, argued that New York forfeited its
right to preclude a citizen-suit by ignoring the sixty-day window 34 before
the citizen-suit commenced. 35  Although the citizen had a statutorily
granted right to proceed with the suit, the court held that a continuance of
the citizen plaintiffs suit would not redress an injury after the consent
decree.36
Seven years after Eastman Kodak was decided, the Supreme Court,
in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,37 addressed a similar
situation in which an environmental group brought an action against a
steel manufacturer under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
To-Know Act of 198638 for failure to make required reporting.39 Although
the facts of this case did not specifically address the Clean Water Act, the
Court's approach to the redressability issue proves analogous to citizen-
suits' continuance under the Clean Water Act. In Steel Company, the
Court chose to focus on whether the alleged violations ceased, and if they
did, whether the continuation of the citizen-suit should proceed. 40 This
basic, yet fundamental approach laid the foundation for the court's
interpretation of the "case" or "controversy" requirement. If a valid state
consent decree essentially extinguishes all of the citizen-suit's claims, the
suit can no longer redress a cognizable injury.
Argued in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit only one day after the Steel Company decision, Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.41 addressed the issue
of whether a citizen-suit should continue after a lower court previously
assessed penalties against the polluter. 42 The plaintiffs alleged continuous
violations of Laidlaw's NPDES permit. 3 Although the district court held
that Laidlaw violated the NPDES permit and imposed penalties upon the
3 See id. at 126.
34 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1).
35 See Atlantic States Legal Found. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d
Cir. 1991).
36 See id. at 126-27.
37 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
3 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(1) (1994).
39 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 86-88.
40 See id. at 88-103.
41 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
42 See id. at 304.
41 See id. at 305.
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defendant, the court denied the plaintiffs request for injunctive and
declaratory relief.
44
The court focused its analysis primarily on standing and held that the
citizen plaintiff did not meet the Article III "case" or "controversy"
requirement due to a lack of a cognizable injury.4 5 Adhering to Steel
Company, the court found the citizen action moot because any additional
civil penalties assessed against Laidlaw would be payable to the United
States Treasury, not the plaintiff.4 6 Therefore, such penalties could not
redress any injury suffered by the citizen plaintiff.47
It is extremely important to note that this case has been fully
overturned by the Supreme Court.48  Thus, the importance of the Fourth
Circuit's decision lies not in its precedential value, but in the court's
persuasive analysis of the mootness issue. Although the Supreme Court
reversed the case, its holding may be confined to its facts and does not
address an instance where a state consent decree ceases all pollution and
assesses large penalties to deter future conduct.49
2. Precedent Against Dismissal of the Citizen-Suit
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. American Recovery Co.,5° the
Fourth Circuit held that a subsequent government suit did not bar an
environmental group's suit and that the group had standing.51 The
Chesapeake Bay Foundation ("CBF") gave notice to both the state and
federal government of their intent to sue the defendant for effluent
discharge violations. 52 CBF filed suit on the same day, but before the
government filed its action against the polluter.5 3 Overruling the district
court, the Fourth Circuit held that the mere commencement of a
concurrent state or federal action should not moot a duplicative citizen-
suit.5
4
44 See id. The court did not give the plaintiff declaratory and injunctive relief because it
found that at the time of Laidlaw's final order, it had been in compliance for several years
and had not harmed the environment. See id. at 305.
41 See id. at 306-07.
46 See id.
47 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4th
Cir. 1998).
48 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
49 For further discussion of Laidlaw, see infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
50 769 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985).
"' See id.
52 See id. at 208.
" See id.
14 See id. at 208-09.
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Rendering a similar verdict, the Second Circuit revisited a citizen-
suit's standing in light of a subsequently filed state consent decree in
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Pan American Tanning Corp.55
Unlike its previous holding in Eastman Kodak Co., the Second Circuit
held that the defendant's settlement with a local enforcement agency did
not moot a citizen-suit for civil penalties. 6 The defendant, Pan American,
operated a tannery and discharged pollutants, which were governed by a
local sewer board and federal regulations. 57  Before the local agency
entered into a consent decree with the defendant, the citizen group filed
suit under the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act.58 This court
made a distinction between claims for injunctive relief and claims for civil
penalties. 59 The court held that post complaint compliance with the Clean
Water Act will not render a citizen-suit for civil damages moot.60  In
5 993 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1993).
56 See id. at 1018. This holding did not overturn Eastman Kodak; rather, the court
distinguished the Eastman Kodak decision primarily on the amount of penalties assessed
against the polluters under the consent decree. See id. at 1022. The court explained that
where the Eastman Kodak holding hinged on "' [w]hether [a citizen-suit] may continue in
the face of a dispositive administrative and criminal settlement,"' the current consent
decree of only $6,600 did not warrant a dismissal of the citizen-suit. Id. (quoting Atlantic
States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991)).
57 See Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d at 1018.
58 See id. at 1019.
59 See id. at 1020. This court relied primarily on Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), in which the Supreme Court held
that the Clean Water Act does not allow a citizen-suit to proceed for "wholly past
violations." Id. at 64. The Court in Gwaltney further explained that a citizen-suit no
longer has standing unless there is a "reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will
continue to pollute in the future." Id. at 57. In Pan American Tanning Corp. the Second
Circuit addressed the question left open by Gwaltney: whether mootness bars only claims
for injunctive relief or whether it also bars claims for civil penalties. See Pan Am.
Tanning Corp., 933 F.2d at 1020. Most of the circuits that have addressed this issue have
come to the same conclusion that post-complaint compliance does not necessarily render
claims for civil damages moot. See Robert Wiygul, Gwaltney Eight Years Later:
Proving Jurisdiction and Article III Standing in Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 8 TuL.
ENVTL. L.J. 435, 453 (1995). See also Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 1990) ("If the parties are able to make a valid
request for injunctive relief at the time the complaint is filed, then they may continue to
maintain a suit for civil penalties, even when injunctive relief is no longer appropriate.").
Cf. NRDC v. Texaco Ref. and Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 503 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("[C]laims for
damages are not moot because an intervening NPDES permit eliminates any reasonable
possibility that Texaco will continue to violate specified parameters."); Carr v. Alta
Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1065 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Even had the improvements
mooted the plaintiffs' action for injunctive relief, it would not necessarily have mooted
the plaintiffs' action for civil penalties.").
60 See Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d at 1021.
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reaching its decision, the court expressed concern for the "language of the
Act," but offered no analysis regarding such language.61 Contrary to this
court's analysis, the plain language of the Act does not directly address
such a situation.
In a similar fashion to Pan American, the district court of New
Jersey, in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Elf
62Atochem North America, Inc. encountered a situation in which the
citizen group filed suit well before the statutory deadline. 63 In this case,
the EPA delegated the responsibility of administering NPDES programs in
New Jersey to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
and Energy ("NJDEPE"). 64 The state issued a permit to the defendant,
which manufactured fluoropolymers and treated its own waste before
discharging into either Little Mantua Creek or the Delaware River.
65
Following the proper procedural steps under the Clean Water Act, the
plaintiffs filed a citizen-suit alleging that the defendant had violated and
continued to violate the effluent standards set forth in the NPDES.66
After the filing of the citizen-suit, the NJDEPE entered into
negotiations with the defendant, which eventually led to a settlement.67
Under the terms of the consent decree, the defendant paid a penalty
totaling $275,000 in return for an exemption from further liability for
certain violations.68  The district court of New Jersey overruled the
defendants motion for summary judgment. 69 In overruling the motion, the
court held that a consent decree between the state government and the
violator entered into after the citizen plaintiffs gave notice to sue and
under which the polluter paid large fines, did not moot the citizen-suit
under the Clean Water Act.70  In so holding, this court ignored the
fundamental principles of standing and enlarged the power of a citizen-suit
beyond its initial intentions.
61 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1020
(2d Cir. 1993).
2 817 F. Supp 1164 (D.N.J. 1993).
63 Id. at 1169.
6 Id. at 1168.
65 Id. at 1169.
66 See ElfAtochem, 817 F. Supp. at 1169.
67 Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 817 F. Supp.
1164, 1169 (D.N.J. 1993).
68 See id. The court acknowledged the fact that the alleged violations in the citizen-suit's
complaint virtually mirrored the violations for which the consent order had provided
immunity.69 See id. at 1183.
70 See id.
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The most compelling argument in support of allowing the
continuance of the citizen suit derives from the very recent Supreme Court
decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services.
This Supreme Court decision directly overturned the Fourth Circuit
decision, which had upheld the dismissal of the citizen suit for lack 'of
standing. 7' Although the Court refused to extend the holding in Steel
Company to uphold a mootness argument, Laidlaw may be held only to its
facts, which do not discuss the instances of a consent decree that ceases all
pollution.
72
In 1986, Laidlaw Environmental Service purchased a hazardous
waste incinerator in South Carolina, which included a means for treating
wastewater.73  The South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control ("DHEC") soon granted Laidlaw an NPDES
permit, which authorized the discharge of treated water into the North
Tyger River.74 In 1992, the Friends of the Environment and the Citizens
Local Environmental Action Network, Inc filed a notice to Laidlaw
informing the company of their intention to file a citizen suit based on
alleged violations of the NPDES permit. 75 To avoid the citizen suit, the
Court held, Laidlaw contacted the DHEC one day before the 60 day notice
period ended asking whether the DHEC considered filing suit against
Laidlaw.76 The DHEC agreed to file the suit so Laidlaw's lawyer drafted
the complaint on behalf of the DHEC and paid the filing fee. Shortly
after, the DHEC and Laidlaw reached a settlement requiring Laidlaw to
pay $100,000 and make "every effort" to comply with its permit
obligations.7
8
Meanwhile, the district court determined that injunctive relief was
inappropriate because of substantial compliance, but imposed a civil
71 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 149 F.3d. 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
72 The Court distinguished between the inability of a citizen plaintiff to bring or maintain
a suit for wholly past violations and establishing standing because the polluters violations
"existed at the time of the complaint and . . . could continue into the future if
undeterred." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 120 S. Ct. 693, 707
(2000). This characterization does not circumvent the instance where a state agency
enters into a consent decree with the polluter, which ceases all pollution and accesses
heavy penalties that serve to deter. Under that set of circumstances, as this Note
proposes, both legal jurisprudence and logic dictates that the citizen suit should become
moot.
71 See id. at 701.
74 See id.
71 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 120 S. Ct. 693, 701 (2000).
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penalty of $405,800. 79 The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the lower
court's determination, holding that the case became moot after the
defendant complied with the permit. The Supreme Court took great
exception with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that a citizen suit's claim
for civil penalties must be dismissed if the defendant comes into
81 TeCutepandtacompliance with NPDES permit. The Court explained that a
"defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily
does not suffice to a moot a case." 82 This assessment, however, fails to
take into account legitimate consent decrees between a polluter and a state
agency, which require the defendant to stop all pollution and impose large
penalties, which serve to deter future conduct. Under these circumstances,
the Court truly failed to address whether the citizen suit should continue in
federal court.
B. Preclusion Doctrine
Although a citizen-suit may not fit the criteria of mootness, recent
case law suggests that courts should still preclude the continuation of a
citizen action under some circumstances. If a valid consent decree has
addressed the alleged violation under the Clean Water Act, future courts
should not allow duplicative litigation as a result of the citizen action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rendered
a decision in United States Environmental Protection Agency v. City of
Green Forest, Arkansas83 that took a decisive step toward upholding
Congress's intent84 for the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act.
In response to the defendants' violations of their NPDES permits, citizens
sent notice to Tyson Food, Inc. and the City of Green Forest, co-
defendants in the suit, informing them of their intent to file suit, as
mandated by section 1365(b)(1)(A) of the Clean Water Act.85 Subsequent
to this notice, in September of 1987, the EPA filed suit against the State of
Arkansas and the City of Green Forest for violations of the Clean Water
Act.86 This enforcement action on behalf of the state government resulted
'9 See id. at 700.
80 See id.
8 See id.
82 Id.
83 921 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 956 (1991).
84 See AMENDING THE CLEAN WATER ACT, HEARINGS ON S. 53 AND S. 652 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON ENVTL. POLLUTION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS,
99th CONG. 9 (1985).
85 See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1400.
86 See id. at 1397.
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in a consent decree with the City of Green Forest.87 The citizen-suit,
however, proceeded to trial where the court found against Tyson under the
Clean Water Act and for Green Forest on the citizen group's allegations. 88
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the consent
decree precluded the citizen-suit from continuing. 89
The Eighth Circuit again addressed the issue and reinforced the
City of Green Forest holding through a different analysis in Comfort Lake
Association, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting, Inc.90 In that case, the defendants
were issued an NPDES permit, which required corrosion and sediment
control facilities to protect nearby water supplies from run-off.9' The
citizen plaintiff issued a notice of intent to sue.92 During the sixty-day
window in which the citizen plaintiff must wait before filing suit, the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency ("MPCA") inspected the site and
issued a Notice of Violation to the defendant. 93 The citizen plaintiff then
filed suit against the defendant for violating the NPDES permit.94 After
construction of the store, however, the MPCA negotiated a proposal of
sanctions and eventually settled with the polluters, assessing $12,203 in
civil penalties including $6,100 payable to the City of Forest Lake. 95 The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgement and
dismissed the citizen-suit.96
While reiterating much of the analysis from City of Green Forest,
the Eighth Circuit extended the preclusion principle to informal
agreements between a state or federal agency and the polluter.97 This bold
step toward recognizing the intent of a citizen-suit under the Clean Water
Act reinforced precedent that precluded citizen-suits in the face of valid
state consent decrees. In Comfort Lake, the court made the distinction
between a consent order, which precludes a citizen-suit through res
judicata, and the informal stipulation agreement present in this case.98
Nonetheless, the court held that in order to achieve the Clean Water Act's
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See United States Envtl. Protection Agency v. City of Green Forest, Arkansas, 921
F.2d 1394, 1403-05 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 956 (1991).90 138 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1998).
9' See id. at 353.
92 See id. at 353-54.
9' See id. at 354.
94 See id.
9' See id.
96 See Comfort Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting, Inc., 138 F.3d. 351, 357-58 (8th
Cir. 1998).
97 See id. at 357.
98 See id.
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goal of sustaining "the primary responsibilities and rights of States to
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution" the preclusion principle must
extend to informal agreements.
99
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MOOTNESS, RES JUDICATA, AND
A STATE CONSENT DECREE UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A consent decree has been characterized as a "judicial act [that]
'possesses the same force and character as a judgement rendered following
a contested trial."' 00 Thus, when a court approves a consent decree, it has
the same effect as a judgment at trial. As previously discussed, if the state
action commences before the citizen suit, the citizen plaintiff is statutorily
precluded from bringing suit. The problem, however, arises when the
citizen files a suit and the state subsequently enters into a consent decree
with the violator. Based on congressional intent and recent court
precedent, courts should frequently render a citizen-suit moot or precluded
after a state agency negotiates a consent decree with an alleged violator,
which ceases all pollution and imposes substantial penalties to deter future
misconduct.
A. Mootness Principle
Under Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, a
federal court must have jurisdiction to entertain a claim.' 0' To establish
jurisdiction, a "case" or "controversy" must exist before the Constitution
will extend this "judicial power."' 0 2 To proceed on the merits of a case, a
plaintiff must have standing to sue in federal court.'0 3 The Court has
recognized that the mootness principle "protects defendants from the
maintenance of suit ... based solely on violations wholly unconnected to
any present or future wrongdoing, while it also protects plaintiffs from
99 Id.
'00 U.S.C.S.R. Civ. P. 54 n.3 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Homestake
Mining Co., 595 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1979)).
101 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 86-103 (1998).
102 See id. The Court explained the Constitutional demand thus: "Article III, § 2 of the
Constitution extends the 'Judicial Power' of the United States only to 'Cases' and
'Controversies.' We have always taken this to mean cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to and resolved by the judicial process." Id. (quoting Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911)).
103 See id.
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defendants who seek to evade sanction by predictable 'protestations of
repentance. and reform."
0 4
The Supreme Court has required that a party meet a three-pronged
test to achieve constitutional standing.'0 5 First, the plaintiff must allege an
"injury in fact" or a specific and "concrete" instance of injury that is not
"conjectural '."'10 6  Secondly, the plaintiff must establish causation by
showing a "fairly traceable" connection between the defendant's actions
and the .plaintiff's alleged injury. 10 7 Third, the relief that the plaintiff
seeks must likely redress the alleged injury.'0" The plaintiff filing the
citizen-suit under the Clean Water Act bears the burden of proving all
three of these elements: injury in fact, causation and redressability, in
order to achieve standing in federal court. 0 9 Although the plaintiff must
prove all three elements, this Note analyzes only the redressability prong
of the case or controversy triad.
1. Citizen-Suit's Failure to Satisfy the Redressability Prong
The Court in Steel Company focused its holding on the citizen-
suit's lack of redressability following a valid state consent decree." 10 The
Court suggested that lower courts should analyze redressability in terms of
whether a plaintiff "personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
court's intervention."''  One may argue that if a consent decree does not
exactly mirror the citizen-suits' complaint or prayer for damages then the
injury has not been fully redressed. Thus, the citizen would benefit from
the additional penalties assessed. The Court, however, quickly debunked
such a bright line theory. It explained that such penalties might be viewed
as a means by which to compensate the plaintiff if the proceeds were paid
directly to the respondent."1 However, as specifically addressed in the
Clean Water Act, the penalties resulting from governmental enforcement
104 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66-67
(1987) (quoting United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)).
105 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 540 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
'06 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103.
107 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998).
log See id.
'09 See id.
"o See id. at 101-09.
.. Id. at 104 n.5. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, contested Justice Stevens's
concurrence, which interpreted redressability as judicial activism. Instead of viewing it as
such, Justice Scalia suggested that redressability has been "ingrained in our jurisprudence
from the beginning" and that the standard of personal benefit has always existed. Id.
112 See id. at 106.
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are payable only to the United States Treasury."1 3 Therefore, the Court
held, the respondent seeks redemption not for his own personal injury, but
for a "vindication of the rule of law."' 14 This analysis also proves true
under the Clean Water Act's citizen-suit provision. 115
Congress did not intend for the citizen plaintiff to police the
waterways in hopes of personal gain. Rather, the congressional
amendments of 1985 included the provision to help protect our nation's
water 116 and vindicate "undifferentiated public interest."1 17 The use of this
provision by overzealous plaintiffs who wish both to punish violators
twice for the same mistake and to accumulate large refundable litigation
costs 118 does not further the goals of the Clean Water Act.119
In response to the Court's refusal to allow actions based only on
personal gain, a citizen may also argue that he derives satisfaction at the
thought of contributing to our nation's treasury and by punishing a
polluter. The Court in Steel Company, however, explained that although a
citizen "may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that . .. a
wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the nation's laws are faithfully
enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy
because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.' 12 In reference
to the Clean Water Act, a citizen-suit cannot continue if the plaintiff will
gain only a "psychic satisfaction" from the suit's continuance, and the suit
does not redress a cognizable injury.121
Without proof of present and continuing detrimental effects, a
citizen-suit cannot proceed based solely on past violations of the Clean
113 See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994);
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998).
114 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106.
115 Cf. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 120 S. Ct. 693, 715 (2000) (Scalia,
J. dissenting) (asserting that to allow a public penalty to support standing cuts across the
grain of Supreme Court jurisprudence).
116 CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1985, S. REPT. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985).
"7 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106. See also Local Envtl. Awareness Dev. v. Exide Corp., No.
CIV.96-3030, 1999 WL 124473, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999) (holding that civil
penalties under the Clean Air Act do not redress a citizen plaintiffs injuries "if there is
no ongoing compliance problem and no possibility of a future one").
11s As authorized by the CWA, the court may award litigation costs to "any prevailing or
substantially prevailing party." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). The application and analysis of
litigation costs will be discussed further infra part III.
119 See S. REPT. No. 99-50 at 28 (1985).
120 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 107.
121 Id. at 107.
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Water Act. 12 2 The ability of a state consent decree to moot a citizen-suit's
claim in federal court, therefore, hinges on the consent decree's
effectuation of the citizen plaintiff s redressable claims. 
123
A court should disregard the timing of the consent decree and
focus on whether the agreement effectively penalized the violator and
stopped the violation. 124 If the governmental agency fulfills its
responsibility under the Act, reprimands the violator, and stops all
misconduct, present and future, courts should find the citizen suit moot.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Laidlaw
undermines and confuses the intent of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision. The Court makes a sweeping statement, which dictates that
under most circumstances civil penalties will support a plaintiff's citizen
suit. 125 The Court's analysis and holding, however, neither addresses nor
applies to instances where a state consent decree requires the present and
future cessation of pollution and imposes substantial penalties. The
opinion fails to recognize the long standing jurisprudence of mootness, yet
ironically appears to support the expansion of generalized grievances to
include actions under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act.
122 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 67
(1987). See also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 109 (holding the same for EPCRA violations).
123 Subsequent courts have interpreted the holding in Steel Company to address only
instances in which the violations have ceased. See, e.g., San Francisco Baykeeper v.
Vallejo Sanitation and Flood Control Dist., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that even after state action, a citizen plaintiff achieved constitutional standing
for civil penalties relating to ongoing or continuous violations of the defendant). The
Supreme Court held in Laidlaw that standing will be met if the violations are "ongoing at
the time of the complaint and that could continue into the future if undeterred." Friends
of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 120 S. Ct. 693, 707 (2000) (emphasis added). The
court did acknowledge, however, that a case could become moot if "'subsequent events
made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur."' Id. at 708 (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968).
124 Although a claim will not automatically become moot due to the defendant's
voluntary compliance subsequent to the filing of a citizen-suit, a court should dismiss the
action as moot if the defendant demonstrates that the alleged violation has ceased and the
wrong will not occur again. See Anderson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 863,
872 (D. Kan. 1999).
121 See Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 706-07.
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2. Reaffirmation of Steel Company and its Analysis
In Laidlaw, the Fourth Circuit reinforced and reaffirmed the
redressability approach laid forth in Steel Company.'26 Although the
lower court in this case penalized the defendant company $405,800, it
denied the citizen plaintiffs request for declaratory and injunctive
relief.127. This court focused its analysis solely on the redressability
element of standing and rejected the plaintiffs request that the defendant
suffer additional penalties.'
28
In a decisive opinion, the Fourth Circuit followed Steel Company
and held that the citizen plaintiff suffered no injury sufficient to sustain an
Article III "case" or "controversy."' 29  The court based its decision
primarily on the fact that any additional penalties assessed against the
defendant would be paid to the United States Treasury. 30 Therefore, the
court applied the Supreme Court's reasoning and held the "action [was]
moot because the only remedy currently available to Plaintiffs--civil
penalties payable to the government-would not redress any injury
Plaintiffs have suffered."' 131
Although Laidlaw did not specifically address the effect of a state
consent decree on a citizen plaintiffs standing in federal court, the Fourth
Circuit's holding reinforced Steel Company's emphasis on redressability.
This decision provides guidance to future courts that a citizen plaintiffs
mere desire to punish a polluter more severely does not "constitute a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues."' 32  Therefore,
following the analysis reaffirmed in the Fourth Circuit, future courts
should find a citizen-suit moot if a valid state consent penalizes a polluter
and thus redresses the only cognizable injury allegedly suffered by the
citizen plaintiff.
126 See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 149 F.3d 303, 305-07 (4th Cir.
1998). See also Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 20 F. Supp 2d 263, 266-68
(D.N.H. 1998) (holding that a citizen plaintiff's action is moot under the Clean Water Act
because a previous injunction stopped the defendant's alleged violations).
'
2 7 See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 305.
'
28 See id. at 306-07.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 306.
13 See id. at 306-07.
132 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 149 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1998).
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As discussed above, however, the Supreme Court directly
overturned this Fourth Circuit decision. 133 The Court focused on the
application of Steel Company and held that when violations have not fully
ceased, then a citizen suit may continue for only civil penalties. 134 The
implications of this decision will be discussed below.
In Eastman Kodak Company, the Second Circuit followed
congressional intent and common law principles of mootness to correctly
find the citizen action moot for lack of redressability. 135 Following many
of the same principles in Steel Company, that court stated that "if the state
enforcement proceeding has caused the violations alleged in the citizen-
suit to cease without any likelihood of recurrence-has eliminated the
basis for the citizen-suit-we believe that the citizen action must be
dismissed.'
136
Congress envisioned a limited role of citizen-suits,' 37 allowing the
state or the EPA to intervene in the citizen-suit at any time.' 38 Based upon
Congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent, this standard should
be clarified to hold a citizen-suit moot even if the consent decree did not
eliminate the basis for the citizen-suit entirely. The Eastman Kodak court,
for example, cited Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 139 which did not allow citizen-suits to address "wholly
to past violations nor seek to recover fines and penalties that the
government has elected to forego.' 140 The Supreme Court in Gwaltney
held that the citizen-suit cannot proceed even if its complaint sought
higher fines and penalties. 141  Although the court in Eastman Kodak
133 See generally Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693
(2000).
134 See id. at 706-07.
135 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127-28
(2d Cir. 1991).
136 Id. at 127. See also Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York City Dept. of
Envtl. Protection, 27 F. Supp. 2d 380, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a citizen
plaintiff lacks standing to enforce a state standard for wastewater that is stricter than
standards mandated by the Clean Water Act). If enforcement under the Act occurs and
the violations cease, then the citizen plaintiff may not continue his suit to penalize the
defendant under a stricter state standard. See id.
'37 Congressional concern included the ability of the citizen-suit to "heighten the chances
for dual penalties under the act," thus "undermin[ing] the authority of State officials and
make the States shy away from spending any money at all to enforce the provisions of the
[A]ct." 131 CONG. REC. S8099 (daily ed. June 13, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Wallop),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 1353-54.
138 Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (1994).
139 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
140 Id. at 60-61.
141 See id.
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suggested this logical approach, the Second Circuit failed to adequately
clarify its stance. 142 This lack of strong precedent serves to further cloudy
the already muddy precedential waters.
3. Rejection of the Redressability Analysis
The federal district court for the District of New Jersey, in Ef
Atochem, failed to follow Eastman Kodak's unstable analysis.
Although this court focused on determining whether the consent order
triggered preclusion under the Clean Water Act, the importance of Elf
Atochem to this Note lies in its analysis of the citizen-suit's constitutional
mootness. In this case, the district court, like the Second Circuit,
recognized civil. penalties as separate and distinct from a claim for
injunctive relief.'14
In Elf Atochem, the state consent decree ceased the violations and
assessed large penalties against the defendant.145 The defendant correctly
argued that because the consent decree levied fines and the pollution
ceased, the court should dismiss the plaintiffs citizen-suit as moot. 146 The
court, however, rejected Eastman Kodak as simply unconvincing. 147
Instead of properly analyzing the precedent, this court dismissed Eastman
Kodak, claiming that the court only interpreted the statutory preclusion
provision of the Act, which is irrelevant to a constitutional mootness
issue. 14 8 This judicial gloss undermined the purpose of the Clean Water
Act and principles of mootness by ignoring the role of a citizen-suit to
supplement, not supplant state and federal enforcement of the Act. 149
Although Elf Atochem stated that the proper analysis depended on
142 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F. 2d 124, 129 (2d Cir.
1991).
143 See Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. ELF Atochem N. Am., Inc., 817 F.
Supp. 1164, 1171 (D.N.J. 1993).
"4 See id.
141 See id. at 1169-70.
146 See id. at 1171.
147 The court explained, "[w]e do not find Eastman Kodak convincing. Its reasoning is
based on policy arguments invoking the purposes behind the Clean Water Act, which
may be instructive in interpreting the statutory preclusion provisions of the Act itself but
are irrelevant to the constitutional mootness issue." Id. (citation omitted).
148 See id.
149 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60
(1987).
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establishing a "live" case or controversy for Article III standing,
150
Eastman Kodak also used a similar approach.'15'
The court's failure to properly analyze the Eastman Kodak holding
led to a decision that failed to address the redressability prong of
mootness. As discussed above, in order for a citizen-suit to continue in
federal court after a state consent decree, there must exist a concrete,
cognizable, and redressable injury. The court in Elf Atochem concluded
that the prayer for additional penalties above and beyond the government's
settlement with the polluter constitutes a live case or controversy that can
be redressed by continuation of the citizen-suit. 152 This court based its
opinion on the legal theory that a court should not render the action moot
unless the court cannot grant 'any effectual relief whatever"' to the
plaintiff.'53
Although the court's decision may fulfill the general deterrence
function of the Act's penalties, it failed to uphold the principle of
redressability. Furthermore, the court rejected the principles laid forth in
Eastman Kodak and Gwaltney.154  Moreover, since the holding in Elf
Atochem, the Supreme Court has clarified the same issue in Steel
Company'55 The Court's explanation of penalties under the EPCRA,
which can be logically analogized to the Clean Water Act, directly negates
the court's analysis in ElfAtochem.
Although the Elf Atochem court allowed the continuance of the
citizen-suit after a state consent decree because the alleged violations
could accumulate more penalties, the Supreme Court rejected this
approach. 156 Steel Company rendered. the citizen action moot because the
'50 See Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. 817 F. Supp.
1164, 1171 (D.N.J. 1993).
151 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d
Cir. 1991). Much like the current court's focus on a constitutional standing issue to
determine mootness, the Eastman Kodak court also held that the case will not be moot if
there is "a realistic prospect that the violations . . . will continue notwithstanding the
settlement." Id. Although not couched in terms favorable to the court at hand, this
holding emphasized the need for a live case or controversy that can be redressed. The
court, however, concluded that because the polluter had paid large penalties already, the
citizen-suit would not redress any cognizable injury. A continuance of the citizen's
action would serve to punish a defendant twice for the same offense. See id. at 127-28.
152 See ElfAtochem, 817 F. Supp. at 1172.
'
53 See id. at 1171.
154 The court explicitly stated that it "[did] not find Kodak convincing.". Id. at 1171.
Furthermore, the court rejected Gwaltney as providing "little, if any, support for the
defendant's position." Id.
See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105-10.
156 See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
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penalties did not remediate the citizen; instead, the United States Treasury
collects all penalties assessed.15
7
The Supreme Court, however, has recently confused the issue in
Laidlaw, where it appeared to ignore the holding in Steel Company. The
Court simply disregarded the language contained in Steel Company, which
explained that the citizen suit could not continue because the citizen did
not seek redemption for his own personal injury, rather for the
"vindication of the rule of law.' 58  The Court simply discounted the
application of Steel Company's analysis to the ability of a citizen plaintiff
to establish standing through civil penalties. 159 The Court further implied
that when a complaint is filed and violations exist, then the citizen
plaintiffs suit will never become moot because he established standing at
the outset. Ironically, the Court then explained that a case might
become moot if actions subsequent to the filing of the suit make it clear
that the pollution "could not reasonably be expected to recur."' 6'
Instead of clarifying the issue for lower courts, the Supreme Court
further clouded the river of dispute. This case should be limited to its
facts where the Court felt that the defendant's post complaint compliance
and small fines did not moot the citizen plaintiffs suit. The ambiguous
implications and language of the holding clearly supports a reading that if
a state agency enters into a consent decree with the polluter subsequent to
the citizen's suit, then the citizen plaintiff's action may be moot if the
decree imposed large fines to deter future misconduct and forced the
defendant to cease all pollution, so that it "could not reasonably be
expected to recur."
To allow the continuation of citizen-suits in the face of valid state
consent decrees could wreak havoc on government enforcement of the
Clean Water Act. As the Supreme Court held in Gwaltney, the role of the
citizen-suit is to "supplement rather than to supplant" the role of the
government as the prosecutor.' 62  The Supreme Court's holding in
Laidlaw does not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of a state consent
decree if it deters and stops present and future pollution. To apply
Laidlaw's reasoning to every citizen suit would devastate the enforcement
'7See id. at 106-08.
158Id. at 106.
159 See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 707 (2000).
The Court merely explained that Steel Company does not apply because it held that
"citizen suitors lack standing to seek civil penalties for violations that have abated by the
time of suit." Id.
160 See id. at 708.
161 Id.
162 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).
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of the Clean Water Act. If the citizen-suit takes precedence over state
enforcement, state agencies have no incentive to intervene and fulfill their
duties under the Clean Water Act. Such apprehensiveness will ultimately
lead to under-enforcement of the Act and an inevitable deterioration of our
nation's waterways. 1
63
4. Advantages of a Totality of Circumstances Approach to Mootness
Although the above analysis provides some guidance for lower
courts to find a citizen-suit moot under the discussed circumstances,
several courts have rejected such an approach. In American Recovery, the
Fourth Circuit's analysis roved more important than its ultimate
dismissal of the citizen-suit.l 6 As discussed above, section 1365(b)(1)(A)
of the CWA gives the government the right of first refusal to bring an
action against an alleged polluter. The defendant argued that the citizen-
suit was moot, but not precluded under this provision of the Clean Water
Act. 165  The court's decision hinged on its bright line ruling that a
subsequently filed state or federal suit against the polluter will not bar a
citizen-suit. The reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in that case, however,
appears dubious at best.
The court in American Recovery conclusively established that a
"district court has available means, including consolidation, citizen
intervention, and intervention by the Administrator to manage its docket
and to protect defendants from duplicative litigation, but dismissal of a
previously filed citizen-suit is not an appropriate remedy.' ' 167 Such a strict
approach directly contradicts the analyses in Steel Company and Eastman
Kodak, which focused primarily on the inability of a continued citizen-suit
to redress the alleged violation. The Fourth Circuit's establishment of a
bright line rule ignored precedent to the contrary and violated the spirit of
163 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir.
1991).
'6 Although the court dismissed the citizen-suit, it rejected using "dismissal of a
previously filed citizen-suit" as an appropriate remedy. Chesapeake Bay Found. v.
American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1993). Therefore, although the court
reached a just result, it did so by ignoring a totality of circumstances approach and
focusing on the citizen plaintiff's approval of the consent decree. See id.
161 See id.
166 See id. See also Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York City Dept. of Envtl.
Protection, 27 F. Supp. 2d 380, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[S]tate prosecution of the same
claims[,] no matter how diligent, will not preclude a properly filed private action[ ] or
require its dismissal.").
167 American Recovery, 769 F.2d at 209.
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the Clean Water Act. In response to this case, future courts may find it
difficult to balance, the goals of ensuring our nation's clean waters and
avoiding duplicative and costly litigation.
The Act intended for the citizen-suit to aid in the enforcement of
its guidelines to protect our Nation's waterways and water supplies. 168 It
did not, however, envision a citizen-suit taking precedence or preeminence
over the government's role as chief prosecutor. 169 In fact, the citizen-
suit's role was to simply complement the government's role so as to
further the ideals and spirit of the Clean Water Act. 17  In American
Recovery's dicta, the court seemed to recognize the congressionally
intended role of the citizen-suit when it dismissed the plaintiffs suit after
the government entered into a consent decree with the polluter. 17 1 Since
the initial filing of the appeal with the court, the defendant and the
government entered into A "good settlement," to which the citizen plaintiff
had no objections. 172 Appearing to grant much importance to the citizen
plaintiffs approval of the consent decree, the court dismissed the citizen-
suit as moot.
This dependence on the citizen plaintiff, however, proves
problematic to lower courts as the Supreme Court itself cautioned against
empowering the citizen-suit so as to change "the citizens' role from
interstitial to potentially intrusive."' 74 The Fourth Circuit, in American
Recovery undermined its own ability to analyze the totality of the
circumstances, including the citizen plaintiffs complaint, the terms in the
consent decree, and any remaining violations. Under the circumstances of
this case, the court did not address such elements in detail because citizen
plaintiff approved of the consent decree. Based on American Recovery,
however, lower courts have little guidance in situations where the citizen
plaintiff objects to the consent decree. In light of the spirit of the Clean
Water Act's citizen-suit provision, courts should take the totality of
circumstances into consideration and focus on the citizen-suits'
redressability or lack thereof. If the consent decree redresses the injury to
'
68 See AMENDING THE CLEAN WATER ACT; HEARINGS ON S. 53 AND S. 652 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON ENVTL. POLLUTION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE ENV'T AND PUB.
WORKS, 99th CONG. 9 (1985).
169 See id.
70 See id.
171 See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir.
1993).
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987).
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society,' 75 rather than the individual plaintiff, then a court should dismiss
the citizen-suit as moot. The citizen plaintiffs approve of the consent
decree is immaterial to the mootness of the citizen-suit.
5. Inadequacy of a Bright Line Approach to Mootness
As discussed above, according to the principles of standing and
Article III, a court should render a citizen action moot if, after the consent
decree, a furtherance of the action would no longer redress the citizen-
suit's alleged injury. 176 This concept does not contradict the language of
the Clean Water Act, rather it "has been ingrained in our jurisprudence
from the beginning."' 77  Arguably, if a consent decree with a
governmental agency forces the violator into post-complaint compliance,
the agreement then comports with the Act's requirement that any person
violating the permit allowances "shall be subject to a civil penalty.' 78
The Second Circuit in Pan American, however, appeared to have
ignored the principle of standing and the intent of the Clean Water Act. 1
79
The court's decision established a harsh bright line rule, which suggested
that although the consent decree assessed penalties and injunctive relief,
the citizen-suit is not moot if filed before the state agreement. 80 This
logic contradicts the congressional intent of the citizen-suit as a
complement to the government, not a controlling factor in the sanctioning
of Clean Water Act violators.
The defendant in Pan American relied heavily on the Second
Circuit's decision in Eastman Kodak.'8' The Pan American court,
nonetheless, rejected the use of this precedent, but did not overturn its
precedential value. 182 Eastman Kodak offered valuable insight into why
175 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998).
176 See id. at 109-10.
177 See id. at 104 n.5 (explaining that the triad of injury in fact, causation and
redressability has been at the core of the Article III standing requirement since the
beginning). The concept of redressability is not the product of judicial activism, rather
the interpretation of a "case" or "controversy." Id.
178 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 890 F.2d 690, 697 (4th
Cir. 1987), quoted in Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993
F.2d 1017, 1020 (2d Cir. 1993).
179 Since Congress intended for the Clean Water Act to redress pollution in our. nation's
waters, the Pan American Tanning Corp. court's failure to dismiss the citizen-suit after a
consent decree redressed the injury oversteps the Act's purpose. See Federal Water
Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).180 See Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 933 F.2d at 1021-22.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 1022.
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the Pan American decision strayed from the spirit of the Clean Water Act
and ignored the basic legal principles of mootness. As discussed above,
the facts of Pan American parallel Eastman Kodak closely. The same
court in' 1991 found a citizen-suit moot because of no "realistic prospect
that Kodak [would] continue to violate the Clean Water Act as alleged in
the complaint".183 The court in Eastman Kodak provided this clear legal
guidance based on the theory that no injury can be redressed if the violator
has 'ceased its infractions. 184  Thus, the citizen-suit's grievances are
satisfied and the case should be moot for lack of standing.
The inherent problem with the Pan American decision stems not
from its ultimate decision allowing the citizen-suit to proceed, but rather
from its language suggesting that under no circumstances will post-
complaint compliance render a citizen-suit moot.18 5  In distinguishing
Eastman Kodak, this court emphasized the large size of the penalties
assessed against Eastman Kodak under the consent decree as compared to
Pan American's mere fine of $6,000 and $250,000 to upgrade the
wastewater treatment. 186  The Pan American court reiterated Eastman
Kodak and upheld the idea that a citizen plaintiff has no power to "'revisit
the terms of a settlement reached by competent state authorities' or to
'further investigat[e] and monitor[] the state compromise absent some
realistic prospect of the alleged violations continuing.'' ' 87 The court,
nonetheless, glossed over such powerful guidance because it believed no
such facts existed in this case. In such a conclusive analysis, however, the
court failed to acknowledge the lack of evidence suggests that Pan
American would likely continue to violate the Clean Water Act after the
consent decree.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Steel Company implied that
although a state agency did not assess fines as substantial as the plaintiff
desired, this does not establish a redressable injury sufficient to sustain the
case or controversy requirement in federal court. 8 8 Steel Company also
directly negates the ruling in Pan American.189 The defendant in Pan
183 See id.
184 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1022
(2d Cir. 1993).
85 See id. at 1021-22.
186 The Pan American Tanning Corp. court gave great weight to the extraction of $2
million from Kodak and the fact that the panel's mootness discussion focused on the
impact of the state settlement. See id. at 1022.
187 Id. (quoting Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124,
127-28 (2d Cir. 1991)) (alteration in original).188 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 106-08 (1998).
'
89 See id. at 105-06.
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American specifically relied on a redressability argument, which proposed
that the plaintiff could not establish an injury based on monetary penalties
because the United States Treasury, rather than the citizen plaintiff, would
reap the benefits of such penalties.'
9 0
The decision in Pan American leads to a reinforcement of
outrageous citizen-suit damages. Based on the court's analysis of
damages and the similarities between the consent decree and the citizen
plaintiff s prayer, 191 future citizen plaintiffs would be wise to increase
their amount of damages so as to ensure the probability of continued fines
and increased litigation costs. Instead of the bright line ruling in this case,
which forbids a court to moot a citizen-suit after post-complaint
compliance by the defendant; 92 future courts should utilize a totality of
the circumstances standard. If the state enforcement agency and the
defendant act collusively so as to avoid true penalties, then the citizen-suit
should proceed. Or, perhaps if a consent decree only slightly penalizes an
egregious violation, the citizen-suit should continue. Nonetheless, if
future courts intend to uphold the true purpose behind both the Clean
Water Act and the citizen-suit provision, they would be wise to focus
primarily on the state consent decree's ability to redress the citizen-suit's
injury, thus mooting any further claim in federal court.
Although the Supreme Court refused to extend the Steel Company
analysis to the facts in Laidlaw, the Court appears to support a totality of
circumstances approach to determining mootness. In fact, the Court
expressly explained that it "recognize[d] that there may be a point at
which the deterrent effect for a claim for civil penalties becomes so
insubstantial or so remote that it cannot support citizen standing."'193 The
Court noted that in the case at bar, the state settlement did not take into
account the defendant's economic gain from noncompliance and did not
impose a penalty that would serve to deter future violations.' 9
4
Furthermore, Laidlaw itself initiated the DHEC lawsuit, drafted the
'90 See id. The Steel Company case held that only the United States Treasury would
acquire any penalties authorized under EPCRA (analogized to the Clean Water Act).
Therefore, the citizen plaintiff's prayer for such penalties are not to remedy his own
injuries, but that of the "undifferentiated public interest." Id. If a consent decree has
already assessed penalties, merely protecting the United States Treasury from collecting
insufficient fines does not empower a citizen plaintiff to continue suit in federal court.
See id. This is not a redressable injury. See id.
'9' See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1022
(2d Cir. 1993).
92 See id. at 1021.
193 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 707 (2000).
194 See id. at 707 n. 2.
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complaint, and paid the filing fee. 195 The Court focuses more on the
deterrence aspect of the civil penalties rather then the redressability
approach followed in Steel Company.196 Nonetheless, the, holding in
Laidlaw supports a totality of circumstances approach to determine the
mootness of a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act.
Although proponents of bright-line rules 97 may find the sharp pain
of judicial activism at their side, the resolution of when a state consent
decree moots a citizen-suit's federal claim must rest on a case-by-case
analysis. Perhaps one could argue that citizen-suit plaintiffs need
guidance in determining whether to bring a suit against a polluter. The
inherent problem with the establishment of bright line rules providing such
guidance, however, stems from Congress's intent for the role of citizen-
suits.198 Congress envisioned the citizen-suit to aid in the enforcement of
our nation's waterways only when the governmental hammer fell short.
19 9
To force a defendant to suffer dual sanctions because the governmental
agency decided to enforce its laws seems counter-intuitive.
A court should allow a citizen suit to proceed in federal court only
when, in light of the totality of circumstances, a consent decree in state
court fails to redress a cognizable injury. The Supreme Court has
established that a citizen group's desire to sanction the defendant more
heavily than the governmental agency for its own satisfaction or hard line
principles does not establish Article III standing.200  Having failed to
establish standing, a citizen-suit should be dismissed as moot. Without a
flexible totality of circumstances approach to the continuation of citizen-
suits and a strict redressability requirement for standing, many defendants
may suffer double sanctions due to an overzealous and possibly vengeful
plaintiff.
195 See id. at 707.
196 See id. at 706-07.
197 The decisions in which courts have clearly held that a citizen-suit is not moot in
certain circumstances clearly undermine the role of the citizen-suit and constitutional
principles of mootness and redressability. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v.
Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1993); Chesapeake Bay Found. v.
American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985); Public Interest Research Group of
N.J., Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1164 (D.N.J. 1993).
198 Congress intended for the federal, state and local agencies to enforce the Clean Water
Act. The role of the citizen suit is secondary. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 64 (1971), 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N., 3668-3730, reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973).
199 See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(1987); North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir.
1991).
200 See Steel Co v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 523 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1998).
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B. The Preclusive Effect of State Consent Decrees on the Continuation
of a Citizen Suit in Federal Court
If the circumstances of future cases do not lend themselves to
dismissing a citizen-suit as moot after a consent decree, recent case law
offers guidance for lower courts to preclude the continuation of the
citizen-suit under certain circumstances.2 °' A consent decree that
addresses the citizen-suit's grievances leaves nothing for the citizen
plaintiff to continue litigating.20 2 Therefore, courts should adhere to the
longstanding principle of resjudicata and dismiss a citizen-suit even if the
valid state consent decree did not moot the citizen's action.
1. Requirements of Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata dictates that "a final judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes
an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand
or cause of action." 203 Resjudicata serves to bar all claims that arose in a
204previous lawsuit. In the context of a settlement between parties, "[it] is
clear that the doctrine of res judicata does apply to cases in which a
consent decree was entered. ' ' 20 5 A valid consent decree, therefore, carries
20with it the weight of a final judgement in court, 06 which in turn may
preclude the citizen-suit by means of res judicata. To apply the doctrine of
res judicata, four prerequisites must be met: 1) a final judgement on the
merits must have been rendered in the first action, 2) the court in the first
action must have had proper jurisdiction, 3) causes of action in both suits
must be the same, and 4) the parties in both actions must be identical or in
privity.207
201 See United States Envtl. Protection Agency v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d
1394 (8th Cir. 1990); Comfort Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting, Inc., 138 F.3d 351
(8th Cir 1998).
202 See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1404.
203 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
204 See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 131.01 (3d ed.
1997).
205 Smith v. State, 996 F. Supp. 1203, 1206 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
206 See United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 595 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1979).
207 See Smith, 996 F. Supp at 1206; see also City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1403
(citing Lovell v. Mixon, 719 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1983)).
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The first two requirements normally do not pose problems for
courts in determining the outcome of a citizen-suit's fate. A citizen
plaintiff may argue that a consent decree did not decide the judgement on
the merits because the court did not actually litigate all the issues; rather, it
only approved the settlement. This approach, however, falls short because
historically, preclusion applies to issues that could have been litigated, not
only to those that were litigated.2 °8 The second requirement mandates
only that the state court in which the first action took place had proper
subject matter jurisdiction,20 9 personal jurisdiction210 and venue.21'
The third stipulation mandates that both the citizen-suit and the
consent decree share the same cause of action that arise out of "the same
nucleus of operative fact." 212 Citizen suits normally mirror the claims the
government presents against the Clean Water Act violator. The citizen
plaintiff, however, often contests the consent order as not preclusive
because the civil penalties assessed do not equal those of the citizen-suit's
complaint, and they fail to sufficiently sanction the polluter for its
actions. 2 13 Logic dictates that regardless of the penalties involved in the
sanctioning of the violator, the issues remain the same between the state or
federal agency and the citizen plaintiff-protecting our waterways by
enforcing the requirements of the Clean Water Act.
The fourth requirement of privity, which is purportedly required to
establish the consent decree's preclusive effect on a duplicative citizen-
suit, often proves problematic for America's lower courts. To preclude an
impending suit, the action must involve identical parties or the parties
must share privity.214 If a court does not recognize the citizen-suit as
being in privity with the state or federal enforcement agency, then
historically, resjudicata cannot apply and the citizen-suit may continue. 215
Under the common law approach, although "mutuality has been for the
most part abandoned in cases involving collateral estoppel, it has remained
208 See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 131.20[l] (3d ed.
1997).
209 See id. 108.04[l].
210 See id. 108.02[l].
211 See id. 108.04[3].
212 NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
213 Every case discussed in this Note involves citizen plaintiffs who disagree with the
sanctions assessed by the state or federal enforcement agency. This argument, however,
now appears moot after the Supreme Court's holding in Steel Company, which
distinguished these penalties as payable to the United States Treasury and thus not at
issue for further determination by the courts.214 See Smith v. State, 996 F. Supp 1203, 1206 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
215 See id. at 1206.
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a part of the doctrine of resjudicata.' '216 Although this approach follows a
plain language interpretation of res judicata, several recent courts have
extended the preclusion doctrine past this confining application.217 Based
on the intent of a citizen's statutory grant to file suit under the Clean
Water Act and the role of the government enforcement mechanism, recent
precedent correctly precluded a citizen-suit after a state or federal agency
entered into a consent decree with the polluter.
218
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, a citizen-suit should proceed only
"'if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement
responsibility.' 21 9 The Act intended that governmental agencies serve as
its primary enforcers. 220  To expand the citizen-suit's role would
undermine the "supplementary role envisioned for the citizen-suit."'221 A
polluter would inevitably lose all incentive to settle costly litigation if
courts allow a citizen-suit to continue after a consent decree sufficiently
addressed the citizen plaintiff's complaint. No violator would settle, often
incurring large penalties and criminal sanctions, only to find themselves
returning to the same courtroom to face the same issues with a different
plaintiff. The incentive to enter into a consent decree, therefore, hinges on
an assurance that the violations will not be revisited.
The Clean Water Act never intended to supply an angry citizen
plaintiff with a means to gain revenge on a polluting company. Congress
created the CWA with the intention of creating a system by which the
government could ensure the clarity of our nation's water.222 To allow a
citizen-suit to continue after the Act's primary enforcer settles with the
polluter, therefore, strikes contrary to the very grain of the Clean Water
Act's purpose.
216 Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 143 (1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
217 See United States Envtl. Protection Agency v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d
1394, 1403-05 (8th Cir. 1990). Although the doctrine of res judicata generally requires
identical parties or privity to preclude a subsequent action, these courts disposed of the
requirement and precluded the citizen suit. See id.
218 See id.
219 See id. at 1403 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730, and in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973)). The report echoes the Supreme
Court's holding in Gwaltney, which frames the citizen suit as a secondary enforcement
mechanism that aids but does not overpower the role of the government. See Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).220 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
221 ld.
222 See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1994).
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2. Lower Court's Dismissal of the Privity Requirement for Res
Judicata
In City of Green Forest, the court focused primarily on the intent
behind the Clean Water Act.223 The court precluded the citizen-suit after
224determining that the state acted in a parens patriae capacity. The court
explained that "once a state represents all of its citizens in aparens patriae
suit, a consent decree or final judgement entered in such a suit is
conclusive upon those citizens and is binding upon their rights. 225 This
approach to the preclusion principle wisely reinforced the ideals
underlying the purpose of a citizen suit.226 The citizen plaintiff should not
replace the role of the government in protecting the welfare of the waters,
rather it should simply aid in its protection. Although the court framed its
discussion in terms of the EPA's role as chief flrosecutor, the same
rationale should apply to state agency enforcement. 19 Therefore, if a state
agency, which enforces NPDES permits on behalf of all citizens,
intervenes and negotiates a consent decree with a violator, there remains
"little left to be done" by the continuance of a citizen-suit. 228
The City of Green Forest court's analysis of the citizen plaintiffs
request for additional penalties virtually echoed what the Supreme Court
was to hold eight years later in Steel Company. The court in City of Green
Forest held that the United States Treasury will obtain any fines
recoverable under the Clean Water Act, not the citizen plaintiffs in their
individual capacities.2 29
223 See United States Envtl. Protection Agency v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d
1394, 1403-04 (8th Cir. 1990).224 See id. at 1404. The parens patriae doctrine is a concept of standing used to protect
governmental interests such as welfare of the people, water rights and water quality. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
225 See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1404.
226 The City of Green Forest court acknowledged that other cases in other circuits have
disagreed with its holding, including Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Koch
Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 609, 614 (D. Minn. 1988), and Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1555, 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1987). The court, however, focused on the
role of the governmental agencies as chief enforcers of Clean Water Act violations. It did
so based on the legislative history of the Clean Water Act and the Supreme Court's
recognition of such intent in Gwaltney. See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1403-04.
227 Congress intended for the federal, state, and local agencies to enforce the Clean Water
Act. The role of the citizen suit is secondary. See S.REP. No. 92-414, at 64 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730, and in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973).
228 See City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1404.
229 See United States Envtl. Protection Agency v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921 F.2d
1394, 1404 (8th Cir. 1990).
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In a unique but accurate analysis, the court further held that
although the citizen plaintiff may have enjoyed harsher penalties than the
state or federal agency assessed, "such citizens are no more aggrieved than
citizens who are precluded from commencing an action in the first
instance because of pending agency action."23 This analysis provides a
logical viewpoint for future courts to follow. Under the statutory language
of the Clean Water Act, if an agency brings suit against the polluter, the
citizen plaintiff would be precluded as a matter of law if the governmental
agency diligently prosecuted the violation.23' With this foundation, to
deny the use of the preclusion doctrine after a binding settlement between
this chief enforcer of the Clean Water Act and the polluter would conflict
with the Act's primary delegation of enforcement duties specifically to
governmental agencies.232 This unsound denial would allow a citizen
plaintiff to effectively "boot-strap" jurisdiction and avoid preclusion by
commencing with the suit prior to the government's intervention. This
non-preclusive effect would serve to discourage governmental agencies
from negotiating with polluters after a citizen-initiated a suit, realizing the
violator will not settle for fear of dual sanctions.
Pursuant to the City of Green Forest and Steel Company decisions,
the court in Comfort Lake Association v. Dresel Contracting, Inc. held that
if an agency "diligently prosecuted its enforcement demands, the civil
penalties it elected to extract in settling those demands may not be
reconsidered in [a] citizen-suit." 233 Citizen plaintiffs may argue that the
sanctions assessed in a consent decree fail to sufficiently represent their
claims. Thus, they still deserve their "day in court" as a plaintiff to assert
their claims not addressed by the decree. Although this argument is
grounded in the rules of civil procedure, 2 34 in the context of a citizen-suit
such an approach weakens dramatically.
In light of this recent precedent, citizen plaintiffs will have a
difficult challenge proving the governmental agency did not represent
230 See id.
231 See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(B)
(1994).
232 Neither City of Green Forest nor this Note advocates precluding a citizen suit if the
governmental agency did not conclude its suit or enter into a consent decree with the
polluter. As the court explained in that case, such a proposal "flies in the face of the clear
language of the citizens' action provision of the CWA, as well as the legislative history,
which make clear that agency inaction is precisely the circumstance in which private
action is appropriate." City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1405.
233 Comfort Lake Assoc. v Dresel Contracting, Inc., 138 F.3d 351, 357 (8th Cir. 1998).
234 See Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996); Tice v. American
Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 1998).
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235their interests.2I The Comfort Lake court even extended the preclusive
effect by dismissing a citizen-suit if a governmental agency entered into
an informal agreement with a polluter as the result of a diligently
prosecuted enforcement process. 23 An adherence to this strong precedent,
which precluded the citizen-suit, would fulfill the legislative intent behind
the Clean Water Act. Furthermore, following this approach does not
undermine the citizen's statutory rights; rather it allows the governmental
agency to represent the citizen in taking steps to penalize violators and
cease the pollution of our nation's waterways.
To uphold the intent of the Clean Water Act and to ensure the
quality of America's water, state administrators require the power to
enforce the Act to protect the community. Under certain circumstances,
an administrator may agree not to assess civil penalties if the violator takes
other extreme corrective measures to ensure its compliance with the
Act.237 After such compliance, however, a citizen plaintiff may still desire
to impose harsher penalties which the administrator chose to forego. To
allow this citizen-suit to proceed would have a chilling effect on the state's
ability to use alternative means of enforcement. 23 8 The continuance of a
citizen-suit under these circumstances ignores the reality that an
"[a]dministrator [who is] unable to make concessions is unable to obtain
them.''239 Without affording the state's statutory right to enforce the Act,future courts may effectively appoint the citizen plaintiff as "captain of the
litigation., 24
0
The judicial system allows for a plaintiff to obtain his day in court
or a bite of the apple. 2 4 However, to allow a citizen plaintiff to attack the
defendant for the same violations to which he has paid civil and/or
criminal penalties sacrifices the entire judicial apple orchard. The citizen-
suit provision should only serve to supplement the role of the government
23 5Although City of Green Forest used a parens patriae approach, and Comfort Lake
focused primarily on the policy behind the citizen-suit, both precedents ultimately hold
that a citizen-suit's concerns are redressed by the governmental agency. See Comfort
Lake, 138 F.3d at 355-57.
236 See Comfort Lake, 138 F.3d at 358. See also Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp.,
964 F. Supp. 1300, 1322 (S.D. Iowa 1997) ("[A] citizens suit may be barred even absent
formal administrative proceedings where ... the state has authority to issue orders and
assess penalties for violations but chooses instead to order compliance and settle
informally with the violator.").
237 See Williams Pipe Line Co., 964 F. Supp. at 1322.
238 See id.
239 Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir.
1992).
240 id.
241 See Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996).
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as chief prosecutor. 242 The purpose and intent behind the Clean Water Act
never "intended to enable citizens to commandeer the federal enforcement
machinery.,
243
As several courts have improperly overfed an already obese
citizen-suit provision an overabundance of frivolous lawsuits and possible
dual sanctions followed.244 In simplistic terms of fairness, a defendant
who has entered into a consent decree with a state agency and has paid
appropriate penalties should find sanctuary in the judicial doctrine of
preclusion. It hardly appears harsh or Draconian for a court to bar the
redundancy of a duplicative citizen-suit if a state agency diligently
upholds the goal of the Clean Water Act.245 To force a defendant to
endure punishment twice for the same violation runs, contrary to the
fundamentals of the American judicial system.
IV. LITIGATION COSTS AWARDED UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The American legal tradition dictates that a "prevailing litigant is
ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the
loser.",24 6  The Clean Water Act, however, affords "any prevailing or
substantially prevailing party" litigation costs, "including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees. 247
If future courts, subsequent to a valid state consent decree, render a
citizen suit moot or precluded in federal court, the citizen plaintiff should
still receive litigation costs under certain circumstances. To always deny a
citizen plaintiff litigation costs after he initially files suit would serve to
follow the same bright line rulings to which many courts have unwisely
adhered in regard to the continuance of citizen-suits. 248 The determination
242 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60
(1987).
243 Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 949 (8th Cir. 1987).
244 See Elizabeth McKinney, Preclusion of Citizens'Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 10
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 357, 365-66 (1995).
245 See Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1324 (S.D. Iowa
1997).
246 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 554
(1986).
247 Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994).
248 This Note vehemently argues against the courts establishing bright line rules in its
interpretation of the Clean Water Act. A case-by-case analysis or a totality of
circumstances approach would serve to uphold better the ideals of the Act. To suggest
now that under no circumstances a citizen plaintiff, even if found moot or precluded, is
not entitled to litigation costs would reflect the hypocrisy of a solely defendant-oriented
approach.
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of whether a citizen plaintiff deserves litigation costs hinges on the future
courts' interpretations of "prevailing."
A district court has the power to award litigation, costs that are
"reasonable in relation to the results obtained. ' 49 Section 1365(d) of the
Clean Water Act, however, empowers a district court to award litigation
costs at its discretion upon a proper motion.250  The central dispute in
awarding litigation costs lies in a determination of whether a precluded or
dismissed citizen-suit can nonetheless be characterized as "prevailing."
One argument holds that only the state or federal agency actually
negotiating a consent decree with the violator is "prevailing" and should
be awarded litigation costs. On the other hand, a strong counter argument
proposes that "but for" the initial filing of the citizen suit, the
governmental agency never would have acted, and the violations would
still exist.251 In light of strong precedent and the policies of the Clean
Water Act, the latter proposition appears most convincing.
Although a plaintiff may fail to prevail on every issue raised in the
lawsuit, courts should not automatically reduce or extinguish an award of
litigation costs. 252 Thus, even if the governmental consent decree, which
precluded or mooted the citizen suit, did not redress every issue, the
citizen plaintiff should still enjoy an award of litigation costs. The thrust
of future courts' analysis, however, should focus most heavily on the
actual degree of success obtained. 3 Utilizing a totality of circumstances
approach to the settlement of the violations, courts should compare the
outcome of the consent decree with the citizen plaintiff's initial prayer for
relief.
Under the plain language of the CWA, a court should still find the
citizen plaintiff as "prevailing" before statutorily awarding litigation costs.
Generally speaking, if a defendant stops violating a law or alters his
conduct subsequent to the pressure of a lawsuit, the plaintiff prevailed.254
Therefore, although a state consent decree may preclude or dismiss the
federal citizen-suit, the citizen plaintiffs initial claim may have spurred
the final settlement.
In Armstrong v. ASARCO, 255 a polluter and the EPA entered into a
consent decree following the filing of a citizen-suit.256  The court
249 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).
250 See Jones v. City of St. Clair, 804 F.2d 478, 481 (8th Cir. 1986).
251 See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 719 (1987).
212 See 'Hensley, 461 U.S. at 432.
253 See id.
254 See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987) (explaining situations in which a court
has deemed a plaintiff to have prevailed in a civil rights case).
251 138 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1998).
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reinforced the theory that "[w]hen a polluter settles with government
authorities following the commencement of a citizen-suit, it is permissible
to infer that the citizen-suit motivated the settlement, thereby making the
plaintiff aprevailing party.'"257
The holding in Comfort Lake also reflected this judicial sentiment.
In that case, after a consent decree precluded the continuance of a citizen-
suit, the court held that the citizen plaintiff should still receive litigation
costs "if its citizen-suit was the catalyst for agency enforcement action that
resulted in the cessation of Clean Water Act violations.,, 25' Although the
court dismissed or precluded the action, the citizen-suit nonetheless served
its statutory function of redressing Clean Water Act violations.
259
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Laidlaw refused to visit the
issue even though it was argued by the citizen plaintiffs.260 The Court
simply explained that the district court has the duty to award such fees.26'
This prudential approach to the catalyst argument only serves to further
the uncertainty concerning attorney's fees following dismissal of the
citizen's action. Both Armstrong and Comfort Lake, however, provide a
strong legal foundation to award litigation costs to "prevailing" plaintiffs
in citizen-suits, although the court dismissed the action subsequent to a
state consent decree.
Future courts should carefully analyze the government's
interaction with the polluter before the citizen plaintiff officially filed the
citizen-suit. Precedent suggests that if a governmental agency began
enforcing or merely discussing enforcement with the violator, this may
serve to deny the citizen-plaintiff litigation costs.262 Under the preceding
circumstances, the citizen-suit did not act as a "catalyst" to the cessation
of Clean Water Act violations, and accordingly, the court should not
award litigation costs. Although this hair splitting approach may appear
difficult for a court to ascertain, the judicial system would protect the
integrity of the Clean Water Act and the rights of the defendants by
correctly determining the true catalyst-the governmental agency or the
citizen-suit.
256 See id. at 382.
257 Id. at 387.
258 Comfort Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting, Inc., 138 F.3d 351, 357 (8th Cir.
1998).
259 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 128 (2d
Cir. 1991).
26 0 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 711 (2000).
261 See id.
262 See id.
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V. LITIGATION COSTS AS ESTABLISHING STANDING
In terms of litigation costs, the Clean Water Act does not .create
standing to continue the citizen-suit based solely on pursuing such costs.
As discussed above, the consent decree in federal court should extinguish
any Article III case or controversy, thus mooting the citizen-suit. An
argument proposing that a citizen-suit may continue in federal court based
solely on the pursuit of litigation costs lacks precedent and policy support.
In Steel Company, the Court distinctly explained that the
"reimbursement of the costs of litigation cannot alone support
standing." 263  If on the face of the record, the only interest in the
continuance of the citizen-suit terminated as a result of the state consent
decree, courts must exercise "reasonable caution" to ensure the mooted
citizen-suit does not proceed solely to obtain litigation costs.264
Future courts should carefully analyze the true purpose behind the
citizen plaintiffs motive to continue its suit after a state consent decree.
To allow a citizen plaintiff to achieve standing to litigate a Clean Water
Act violation by continuing the suit for the cost of bringing suit runs
counter to the goals of the Clean Water Act and the purpose of section
1365.265 The Clean Water Act envisioned the citizen-suit to aid in the
enforcement of the Act's regulations and to enjoy an award of litigation
costs if it prevailed in the action.266 This incentive encourages citizen-
plaintiffs to analyze carefully the likelihood of actual violations before
filing a frivolous or already moot claim. Supreme Court precedent
provides a clear guideline for lower courts to dismiss a citizen-suit under
the Clean Water Act if its continuance depends solely on an award of
litigation costs to establish standing. 267
Although a state consent decree with violators of the Act should
moot or preclude a federal claim, the award of litigation costs remains a
distinct issue. Litigation costs serve to prevent excessive filings in our
already overbooked courts by rewarding only those suits that "prevail."
The vital issue in future courts' determinations of litigation costs,
therefore, hinges on a clearer definition of "prevail." If a citizen-suit acted
as a catalyst to the state consent decree, case law and logic dictate that
future courts should find a citizen-suit prevailing and award litigation
263 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 108 (1998).
264 Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990).
265 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 109-10.
266 See id.
267 See id.
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costs. 268 To refuse an award of litigation costs simply because a state
agency intervened and enforced the Clean Water Act would serve to
diffuse any incentive for the filing of citizen-suits.
Future courts, however, should take the award of litigation costs
into consideration when assessing penalties or approving consent decrees.
In doing so, a court recognizes both the importance of upholding the Clean
Water Act's purpose and the injustice of sanctioning a defendant twice for
the same violation. This approach also avoids instances, as in the case of
publicly owned water treatment centers ("POTW"), in which high
litigation costs practically render the institution judgment proof. Under
this situation, if the court awards high litigation costs in addition to
already extreme penalties under the Act, the POTWs may raise citizen's
taxes to pay for such costs. The citizens of this nation, therefore, not only
sacrifice the clarity of their water due to a lack of funds, but also
personally pay for its murky outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION
The congressional amendments to the Clean Water Act intended to
supplement the state and federal agencies' role as chief enforcer.269 As the
Supreme Court established in Gwaltney, Congress never intended for the
newly created citizen-suit provision to supersede the power of the
governmental agencies and supplant their role under the Act.27° Without
clear guidance from the Supreme Court, several courts have allowed
citizen suits to continue after the creation of a state consent decree that
redressed the alleged injuries. Although the Court held in Laidlaw that a
citizen suit, under certain circumstances, would not be moot subsequent to
a state agreement, the decision only serves to muddy the issues. On one
hand, the Court establishes a bright line allowing the continuance of the
suits, yet it also implies that the citizen suit could be moot if it only sought
civil penalties.
Such deviation from congressional intent and the plain language of
the Act results in an overabundance of citizen-suits flooding the already
polluted dockets. Based upon the role of the citizen-suit provision and the
purpose of governmental agencies, a citizen action normally should not
268 See Comfort Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting, Inc., 138 F.3d 351, 357 (8th Cir.
1998).2 69 See AMENDING THE CLEAN WATER ACT: HEARINGS ON S. 53 AND S. 652 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON ENVTL. POLLUTION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON ENv'T AND PUB. WORKS,
99th CONG. 9 (1985).
270 See id.
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continue in federal court following a state court consent decree, which
imposes substantial penalties and stops present and future misconduct.
However, if a dismissed citizen plaintiff initiated the government's action
and spurred the settlement with the polluter, then the court should award
the citizen litigation costs. A strong Supreme Court decision, which uses a
totality of circumstances approach to determining a citizen-suit's standing
in light of a state consent decree, would uphold the integrity of the Clean
Water Act and provide lower courts with a solid foundation. Without
future direction from the Court, the role of the citizen-suit will inevitably
expand past its supplemental birth and muddy the waters of the Act with
vengeance and personal self-interest.
